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Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury,
and the Per Se Standard
In 1970, a district court observed: "We must confess at the outset that
we find antitrust standing cases more than a little confusing and certainly
beyond our powers of reconciliation." 1 The court could hardly have been
faulted, for the confusion it noted has been endemic to these cases since
the creation of the treble-damages action. Courts have never read section 4
of the Clayton Act' literally to allow treble damages to every plaintiff able
to attribute an economic loss to an antitrust violation.3 This unwillingness
to recognize every such injury is fully consistent with the essential princi-
ple of antitrust law-that the antitrust laws protect competition as a
whole, not individual competitors.' Instead of relying upon this substan-
tive principle, however, courts have often used common-law rules of prox-
imate cause to restrict the number of potential plaintiffs. These rules of
tort have produced results inconsistent with the goals of antitrust law and
have been responsible for much of the confusion in standing case law.5
1. Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, 320 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970).
2. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides, inter alia: "[Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor. . . and
shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
This Note will not address standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1982). Standing under § 16 may be available to plaintiffs who lack standing to sue for
treble damages under § 4. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1167 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980); Mid-West Paper Prods. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d
573, 589-94 (3d Cir. 1979). Section 16 has been applied more expansively than § 4 both because its
language is less restrictive-requiring merely a showing of "threatened loss or damage" rather than
injury to "business or property"-and because multiple suits under § 16 against the same defendant
do not pose the dangers of duplicative recovery and overdeterrence that multiple suits under § 4 might
threaten. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-62 (1972).
3. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.) ("Read literally,
[section 4] could afford relief to all persons whose injuries are causally related to an antitrust viola-
tion. Recognizing the nearly limitless possibilities of such an interpretation, however, the judiciary
quickly brushed aside this construction."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
4. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). Although some
controversy remains among scholars as to whether the antitrust laws should be concerned only with
furthering consumer welfare in a strictly economic sense, see Sullivan, Economics and More Humanis-
tic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214 (1977), the
Supreme Court has recently described the Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare prescription," Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX 66
(1978)), and has condemned only those practices that "tend to restrict competition and decrease out-
put," see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979). This Note takes no position on
this controversy; it merely seizes upon the Court's most systematic assertions of purpose and attempts
to build a coherent approach to standing consistent with substantive antitrust law.
5. The high cost of litigation makes this confusion especially expensive and the need for a coher-
ent standing doctrine particularly great. Cf Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979) (danger of "vexatious litigation" counsels summary
disposition of antitrust cases when permissible).
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This Note argues that the application of tort analysis to questions of
standing under section 4 has stemmed from a failure to recognize the na-
ture of the per se standard in antitrust law. Once the limited scope of that
standard is appreciated, a standing doctrine more consistent with the con-
cerns of substantive antitrust law can be developed. The standing ap-
proach this Note endorses-one that looks to market effects rather than to
the peculiar circumstances of a plaintiff's injury-is hardly novel; indeed,
one of its chief virtues is that it draws support from several recent Su-
preme Court cases. By discussing the interplay between standing and sub-
stantive antitrust law, however, this Note supports and extends recent
moves toward doctrinal clarity.
I. TOWARD A MARKET-BASED APPROACH TO ANTITRUST STANDING
Every plaintiff seeking treble damages forces the court to answer two
questions: First, what is the purpose of the antitrust laws? And, second,
who is entitled to vindicate that purpose? If the plaintiff endeavors to
show that the defendant's conduct towards him was "unreasonable," the
very form of his case answers those questions. In contrast, if he alleges
that the defendant's conduct was per se illegal, the truncated inquiry of
that standard makes more difficult a court's adherence to the principles of
substantive antitrust law.
A. The Per Se Standard
Although courts have, on occasion, considered such subsidiary goals as
protecting independent businessmen and preventing large aggregations of
capital,6 they have generally held the promotion of free competition to be
the primary concern of the antitrust laws. This focus upon consumer wel-
fare, more pronounced in recent years, has been expressed in the Supreme
Court's assertion that the rule of reason is the "prevailing standard" of
antitrust law.7 Under the rule of reason, the legality of a practice is judg-
ed, not by its effect upon any individual in the marketplace, but rather by
its effect generally upon competition in a particular market.8
6. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897); Kauper, The
"Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populisn, and Cynicism, 67 MIcH. L. REV.
325, 333-34 (1968).
7. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see Gerhart, The Supreme Court
and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 319,
330-32.
8. Justice Brandeis gave the standard its most famous expression:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
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The rule of reason, however, is not the sole standard by which courts
judge allegedly anticompetitive conduct. The Supreme Court has classified
certain practices as per se illegal, conclusively presuming them unreasona-
ble.9 The per se standard has been applied to price fixing,'0 horizontal
allocations of markets," group boycotts,' 2 and tying arrangements.' 3
When a defendant is found to have engaged in one of these practices, a
court will hold him liable without inquiring whether that conduct has
actually had any disruptive effect upon competition.
As merely a "special case" of the rule of reason,' the per se standard is
not intended to condemn conduct that the rule of reason would not bar.
Nonetheless, the per se rules have often operated to expand the scope of
antitrust liability.15 In part, this expansion has been caused by the ques-
tionable validity of the presumptions made by certain per se rules. Expec-
tations that vertical price fixing' 6 and certain kinds of boycotts' will in-
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-91 (1978) (tracing rule of reason's development and ad-
hering to Justice Brandeis' formulation); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)
(under rule of reason, "factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition") (cit-
ing Chicago Bd. of Trade).
9. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), Justice Stevens explained
the rationale underlying the per se rules:
The costs of judging business practices under the rule of reason. . . have been reduced by the
recognition of per se rules. Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the
Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a
conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable . . . . For the sake of business cer-
tainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a
fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable.
Id. at 343-44.
10. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (per curiam); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
11. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211, 244 (1899).
12. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-47 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
13. Strictly speaking, the rule against tying arrangements is not a per se rule: It does not presume
that every tie-in will unreasonably restrain competition in the tied product market. Once certain
standards for amount-in-commerce and market power in the tying product's market are satisfied,
however, such an arrangement is deemed unreasonable without any inquiry into whether it actually
has had adverse effects upon competition. See Jefferson Parish Hsp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 52
U.S.L.W. 4385, 4388 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1984); Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Ting Rule:
Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REV. 1235 (1980). Where those requirements are not met, a
plaintiff complaining of a tie-in is free to pursue his claim under the rule of reason. See Fortner
Enters. v. United States Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 499-500 (1969); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614-15 (1953); Warner Management Consultants, Inc. v. Data Gen.
Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 966-67 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
14. L. SULUVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrausT 196 (1977); see also Redlich, The
Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REv. 1 (1979) (criticizing Burger Court for its
exclusive concern with economic efficiency in applying per se standard).
15. This expansion goes beyond the expected error costs that will always accompany a per se rule.
See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
losses characteristic of per se rules).
16. See R. BORK, supra note 4, at 280-98 (arguing that all vertical restraints, including resale
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variably disrupt competition may well be unfounded. The leverage theory,
which underlies the per se rule against tying arrangements and argues
that a firm can use its power in one market to force its way into another
market, has been especially criticized."8 By freezing certain theories into
mechanically applied rules and by obstructing further analysis, the per se
standard may condemn conduct that would have passed muster under the
rule of reason. 9 Even if the government were the sole enforcer of the
antitrust laws, this overbreadth would impose a cost on defendants in the
form of increased liability, and on society by deterring socially efficient
activities. The existence of the private action for treble damages, however,
has created a second, less noticed, cost of the per se standard.
B. Standing and the Per Se Rules
The broad principle of compensation that section 4 of the Clayton Act
enunciates appears inconsistent with antitrust law's focus upon competi-
tion in particular markets rather than upon the interests of individual
competitors. Through the network of relationships based upon custom and
contract that link various actors in the marketplace, a single antitrust vio-
lation may inflict economic losses upon a host of individuals in a variety of
markets.20 The causal connection of an individual's injury to an illegal
practice, however, is no guarantee that competition in the individual's
market has been affected in the least. 1 This tension between the goals of
substantive antitrust law and those of the private treble-damages action
has been resolved rather easily in cases decided under the rule of reason.
Courts have required the plaintiff in such cases to relate his private injury
to a more public wrong-a threat to competition in his own market.22
Recent cases brought under the rule of reason have conditioned a plain-
tiff's standing upon his ability to define his market, to indicate how that
market was affected by the conduct he challenges, and to attribute his
price maintenance, should be lawful because they serve distributive efficiency without restricting out-
put and thereby promote consumer welfare).
17. See Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 685 (1979) (noting overbreadth of per se condemnation of boycotts).
18. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 171-78 (1976).
19. See Gerhart, supra note 7, at 322-30.
20. See Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting "any
antitrust violation disrupts the competitive economy to some extent and creates entirely foreseeable
ripples of injury which may be shown to reach individual employees, stockholders, or consumers"),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
21. That a firm has lost profits because an antitrust conspiracy forced one of its customers out of
business gives no indication of whether the firm's own market was affected.
22. See Northwest Power Prods. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 88-90 (5th Cir. 1978) (drawing
distinction between private concerns of unfair competition law and public concerns of antitrust law),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
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injury to those effects.23 Because these cases focus so clearly upon a partic-
ular market, courts can bar suits by a plaintiff who is not a participant in
that market with little analysis.24 The simplicity of standing analyses in
cases under the rule of reason-as well as the relative infrequency with
which plaintiffs rely exclusively upon the rule of reason"-probably ex-
plains why so few courts have examined standing in this context.
The per se standard, in contrast, severs the connection between plaintiff
and market that simplifies standing under the rule of reason. The absence
of any requirement that a per se plaintiff make specific market allega-
tions" creates the danger that an unwary court might allow a plaintiff in
a market unlikely to have been affected by the practice he challenges to
pursue a treble-damages claim. Such errors permit the per se standard to
impose greater penalties on a defendant than those he would have suffered
had his practice been judged by the rule of reason. The consequences of
such errors are especially great because of the extent to which plaintiffs
rely upon per se theories and the ease with which arguably per se prac-
tices often can be identified.27 Courts can avoid this danger by recognizing
23. See, e.g., Tose v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 892 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 893 (1981); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 1980);
Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 938 (1979). See
generally Comment, Appl)ing the Rule of Reason: A Survey of Recent Cases and Comment, 17 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 335, 341-48 (1980) (discussing focus upon anticompetitive effects by courts in recent
rule of reason cases).
24. Standing under § 4 has correctly been denied to employees challenging monopolization or
mergers alleged to affect a product, rather than a labor, market, see, e.g., Thomsen v. Western Elec.
Co., 680 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 348 (1982); Solinger v. A&M Records,
Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979), and to plaintiffs
who have exited from the market in which they allege competition to be endangered, see, e.g.,
Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1235 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981);
A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma Instruments, Inc., 628 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1980); Synco, Inc. v. Penn Cent.
Corp., 551 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by
Targets of Tender Offers, 80 Micm. L. Ray. 1155, 1156-65 (1982) (arguing that take-over target
should not be permitted to sue under § 4 because target is beneficiary, not victim, of diminished
competition).
25. As one commentator noted in 1977: "The content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown;
in practice, it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability." Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14 (1977). Prior to
Sylvania, the rule of reason was "used primarily as a rationale for dismissing complaints." Comment,
supra note 23, at 340.
26. In Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1980), the court observed:
The only exception to the requirement of an allegation of anticompetitive effects in a Section
I Sherman Act complaint occurs in the narrow category of per se cases. This follows not from
the fact that anticompetitive effects need not exist to establish the elements of a per se offense,
but rather from the fact that the type of conduct complained of in a per se action is so destruc-
tive of free competition that deleterious effects will be conclusively presumed.
Id. at 555; see Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343, 351 (5th Cir.)
(where per se practice is alleged, "injury to the public interest and competition is inherent in the
charges"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980).
27. Although certain per se illegal practices, such as price fixing, might be much more difficult for
a victim to detect than, say, a tying arrangement, many antitrust actions employing per se theories are
not based upon the plaintiff's own identification of the violation. Prior government actions-or even
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that each per se rule presumes a particular practice harms particular mar-
kets, and by then permitting only plaintiffs within those markets to pur-
sue per se claims.
The failure of many courts to appreciate this limited nature of the per
se standard accounts for much of the confusion that has long plagued
standing doctrine in antitrust cases. Reluctant to permit treble-damage ac-
tions by all individuals able to attribute an economic loss to a per se viola-
tion, but apparently unwilling to directly link standing to substantive anti-
trust law, those courts have often turned to tort law for principles to limit
antitrust standing.
II. DIVERSE LOWER-COURT APPROACHES TO STANDING
Since the early years of the treble-damage action, antitrust standing
analyses have relied-at least in part-upon principles of tort law. Those
difficult standing questions most likely to inspire doctrinal pronounce-
ments in the lower courts have arisen in the course of per se claims, and it
is in applying this standard that courts are most likely to turn to proxi-
mate cause as a limiting principle.
A. The Direct Injury Test
Despite the absence of any explicit indication that Congress had in-
tended to limit the scope of section 4,28 the sweeping promise of that pro-
vision has never been realized. Just as many courts decided that Congress
had meant to condemn only "unreasonable" restraints of trade, 29 so too
they turned to the common law of torts for guidance in interpreting the
prior actions by other private parties-often alert potential plaintiffs to actionable injuries. See infra
note 37.
28. While courts have frequently asserted that Congress must have intended that the same limit-
ing principles used in tort law be applied to suits under § 4, see, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 906 (1983); Calderone Enters. Corp. v.
United Artists Theater Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930
(1972), the record is bare of any evidence of those intentions. Senator Sherman himself delineated the
broad compensatory purpose of the first statutory authorization of the private action for treble dam-
ages, Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)).
See 21 CONG. Rac. 2569 (Mar. 24, 1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). The legislative history of § 4
of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982))-whose language was taken from § 7 of the Sherman Act but expanded to include the of-
fenses newly condemned by the Clayton Act-similarly fails to reveal any intent to limit antitrust
standing. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 12,939 (July 29, 1914) (statement of Sen. Reed) (§ 4 "means, for
all practical purposes, that every man who is hereafter injured by any concern violating the antitrust
statutes can bring suit"); 51 CONG. REc. 9185 (May 6, 1914) (statement of Rep. Helvering) ("It
must be plain that few corporations will care to run the risk of pursuing illegal methods knowing that
they will make themselves liable, not merely to dissolution, but for the payment of damages to all
parties injured.").
29. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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statutory standing provision. Defendants were held liable only for those
injuries of which they were the "proximate" or "direct" cause."
This "direct injury" rule first emerged as a corollary of the traditional
doctrine that only a corporation, and not its shaxeholders, may recover for
injuries the corporation has suffered. 1 It became the prevailing approach
to antitrust standing at least until the early 1950's and, in some circuits,
into the 1960's.12 Courts adhering to the doctrine of direct injury concen-
trated upon whether the plaintiff stood in some relationship to the alleged
antitrust conspirators or upon whether his injury had been intentionally
inflicted. But this vague test of circumstantial relationship could yield in-
consistent results, with the flagrancy of a violation often becoming a sig-
nificant analytical factor. 3
B. The Emergence of the Target Test
Though the direct injury approach failed to provide a clear and consist-
ent method of distinguishing cognizable from non-cognizable injuries,
courts did not seriously consider any alternative during the first sixty-odd
years of the Sherman Act's existence, perhaps because of the rarity of
private antitrust actions during this period.3 The 1950's, however,
30. For discussions of the considerations that frequently affect determinations of proximate cause
in tort cases, see L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 41-45, at 236-90 (4th ed. 1971).
31. See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (stockholder suffered no
"direct injury"); Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 824 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909) (noting
that if both stockholder and his corporation were allowed to recover treble damages, defendant would,
in effect, have to pay sextuple damages for same unlawful act); see also Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund,
434 F.2d 727, 734-37 (3d Cir. 1970) (discussing distinction between derivative actions and suits in
shareholder's own name), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). Both Loeb and Ames construed § 7 of the
Sherman Act, the similarly worded precursor to § 4 of the Clayton Act, and were subsequently fol-
lowed in § 4 cases. See Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 846 n.5 (5th Cir. 1957); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n,
36 F.2d 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
32. See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 1962)
(barring suit by supplier of customer injured by antitrust violation because supplier "too remote and
too far removed from the direct injury"), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Westmoreland Asbestos
Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (barring suit by lessor injured
when antitrust violation led to foreclosure on lessee's property), aff'd per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1940).
33. In one instance, circuits split on whether standing should be allowed to a theater lessor alleg-
ing that an illegal conspiracy among various film exhibitors, including his own lessees, to divide up
the exhibition market caused the lessor to lose profits on a percentage lease. Compare Harrison v.
Paramount Pictures, 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (barring lessor's suit because he was
"too remote" from motion picture business and his injury was "indirect"), affd per curiam, 211 F.2d
405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954) with Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d
587, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1957) (explicitly rejecting Harrison and basing standing on fact that defendants
were "direct and proximate cause" of lessor's "not unforeseeable" injury).
For a discussion of the various judicial applications of the direct injury rule, see Berger & Bern-
stein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 819-35 (1977), and cases
cited therein; see also Note, Antitrust Injury and Standing: A Question of Legal Cause, 67 MINN. L.
REv. 1011, 1015-17 (1983) (collecting cases).
34. See Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 A~rrrrRusT
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brought a flood of private actions.3 5 Not only did an expansion of substan-
tive antitrust law broaden the range of prohibited practices,3 but vastly
increased activity by the Department of Justice provided litigation victo-
ries upon which plaintiffs could "piggyback.13 7 In the face of these devel-
opments, the Ninth Circuit originated a new, "target area" test in Confer-
ence of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc. s
[I]n order to state a cause of action under the anti-trust laws a plain-
tiff must show more than that one purpose of the conspiracy was a
restraint of trade and that an act has been committed which harms
him. He must show that he is within that area of the economy which
is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particu-
lar industry.3 9
This formulation shifted the focus slightly, from how the plaintiff had
BuLL. 5, 5 (1959) (only 175 reported private cases between 1890 and 1940). Moreover, courts dis-
missed many claims not on standing grounds but rather as presenting excessively speculative theories
of causation, or as involving no injury to "business or property" within the meaning of the statute. See
Note, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit,
61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1016-19 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties];
see also Note, Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement, 49 YAE L.J. 284, 298 (1939) (surveying
various challenges that could be made to a § 4 complaint and noting: "Under the circumstances it is
not at all surprising that prospective litigants hesitate to take the risk.").
35. See Bicks, supra note 34, at 5-6.
36. See Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties, supra note 34, at 1011-13 (noting, in 1952,
"[r]ecent expansion of the substantive law of antitrust violations").
37. See Bicks, supra note 34, at 5-9. Once the illegality of a defendant's practice has been proven
in a suit by either the Justice Department or a private plaintiff, the defendant may be estopped from
relitigating significant aspects of his case in subsequent § 4 suits by private parties. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)
(1982). Successful actions by the Justice Department have traditionally provided the basis for a large
proportion of private treble-damage actions. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,
13 J.L. & EcoN. 365, 372 (1970) (of 880 reported § 4 suits in the period 1961-1963, 759 were
preceded by judgment in suit brought by Justice Department).
After a government action against motion picture distributors ended in a decree against the defend-
ants' illegal practice of limiting competition for first-run films, United States v. Paramount Pictures,
66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
334 U.S. 131 (1948), plaintiffs-mostly exhibitors, but also including theater lessors-had a field day.
Of the 367 private antitrust suits pending in 1951, 129 were against the movie industry. See Antitrust
Enforcement by Private Parties, supra note 34, at 1043 n.219.
Many of the leading standing decisions address actions brought in the wake of government enforce-
ment victories, which act as beacons for all private parties injured by the condemned practice, regard-
less of whether or not those injuries are cognizable. See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d
1378, 1380 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983) (following United
States v. H.S. Crocker Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,883 (N.D. Cal. 1976) and United States
v. H.S. Crocker Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,615 (N.D. Cal. 1975)); Fields Prods., Inc. v.
United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (brought in wake of consent decree
against defendant, see 318 F. Supp. at 88), aff'd per curiam, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, 115 F. Supp. 312, 315 (E.D. Pa.
1953) (plaintiff relying on decree in United States v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1946), 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948)), affid
per curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
38. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
39. Id. at 54-55.
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been injured-directly or as a consequence of some other injury-to the
"area of the economy" allegedly endangered, accenting the public nature
of the antitrust laws.
Tort principles nonetheless continued to permeate lower courts' discus-
sions of standing even as those courts applied the target test. An example
of the Ninth Circuit's approach illustrates how that court's concern with
foreseeability and intent operated to enlarge the scope of liability under
the per se standard beyond that which a rule of reason analysis would
have produced. In Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions,4 the plaintiff
alleged that his right to receive royalties from several films was impaired,
and his income thereby diminished, by the defendant-distributor's practice
of "block booking" those films with other, less popular films.4 The Ninth
Circuit held that the plaintiff had standing to sue for his "foreseeable"
injuries.42 The distributor's privity with the plaintiff-producer suggests
that the injury in Mulvey was indeed foreseeable. That injury, however,
was not caused by any disruption of competition in the producer's market.
He had not lost profits because of a competing film's undeserved advan-
tage; he suffered because his contracting partner-the distributor-had
disfavored his interest."' Since the plaintiff made no effort to satisfy the
elements of a rule of reason case, the court should not have permitted him
to proceed.
By not recognizing the limited nature of the per se rule's presumptions,
the Ninth Circuit thus allowed a plaintiff's invocation of that standard to
circumvent a systematic standing analysis more consistent with substantive
antitrust law. In contrast, several other circuits applied the target area test
more "narrowly. '44 Although they seemed to require a plaintiff to allege
40. 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
41. Block booking has been condemned as per se illegal because it is a kind of tying arrangement,
in which the market power derived from desirable titles (the tying products) is employed to force
exhibitors to accept less popular titles (the tied products). See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S.
38, 49 (1962); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948).
42. The court concluded:
[Defendant] directed his activities at the means of distributing films in order to affect their
individual revenue-producing potentials-the target area. [Plaintiff's] films are within this tar-
get area. Consequently, it is entirely foreseeable that [defendant's] block booking could impair
the profit potential of [plaintiff's] films, thus depreciating the value of [plaintiff's] contractual
interest in the films' revenue.
433 F.2d at 1076.
43. See Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of the Clayton Ack" Determina-
tion of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 795, 817-18 (1976)
(criticizing Mulvey court for recognizing plaintiff's "incidental" injury); see also Klingsberg, Bull's
Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on Standing To Sue and Causation Under Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ArrRusT BuL. 351, 356 (1971) (Mulvey "provides little in the way
of analysis to delineate the area of the economy which the prohibition against block booking is
designed to protect").
44. See GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Second
Circuit appears to have adhered to the narrower target area test for standing in its recent opinions");
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that he was the "object" or "target" of the defendant's per se illegal prac-
tice,45 they required no showing of specific intent."' Rather, they allowed
per se claims only by those plaintiffs whose markets were presumed by a
particular per se rule to be threatened.
47
Though this conflict among the circuits applying the target test per-
sisted into the 1970's, with other circuits devising their own idiosyncratic
standing doctrines,48 the Supreme Court gave the lower courts little guid-
see also Lytle & Purdue, supra note 43 (applauding narrow target test). The Tenth Circuit also
seems to have employed the narrow test. See Comet Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. E.A. Cowen
Constr., Inc., 609 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1980) (barring price-fixing claim by party not shown to be
buyer in affected market).
45. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269, 1274 (2d Cir. 1975)
(plaintiffs lack standing because they "were not the objects of the alleged antitrust violation"), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Reading Indus., Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 631 F.2d 10, 12 (2d
Cir. 1980) (Long Island continues to express circuit approach), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981). In
the wake of Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S.Ct. 897
(1983) (see infra pp. 1326-28), the Second Circuit has retreated from this approach. See Crimpers
Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc. 724 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1983).
Although the Seventh Circuit has long been reluctant to accept the target area approach, see Lupia
v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting, without explicit en-
dorsement, trial court's use of target area test), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979); In re Uranium
Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 393, 401 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (noting "doctrinal void" in Seventh
Circuit as to standing questions), several of its more recent decisions have made greater use of the
narrow version of that test, see In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig. (Bichan v. Chemetron), 681 F.2d
514, 517-19 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983); Warner Management Consultants
v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 963 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
46. See Schwimmer v. Sony Corp., 637 F.2d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1980) ("we do not conclude that a
requirement of specific intent should be read into the 'target area' test"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 362
(1982); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (following
Schwimmer).
47. The Second Circuit approved this approach in Fields Prods. Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 432
F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), affg 318 F.Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949
(1971), and affirmed a trial court's denial of standing to a plaintiff much like the producer in Mulvey.
After discussing the rationale underlying the prohibition of block booking, the trial court had held: "It
is thus the television stations and the other distributors who are in the 'target area.' If the block
booking in fact causes any injury to the producer [recipient of royalties] of the pictures which are thus
block booked, that injury is only incidental." 318 F. Supp. at 88. See also Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Standard Oil, 521 F.2d 1269, 1274 (2d Cir. 1975) (limiting standing to challenge boycott to those
parties with whom conspirators refused to deal), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
It should be noted that the use of the target test has hardly been restricted to cases involving per se
allegations. It has also been used in monopolization and merger cases. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Western
Elec. Co., 680 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 348 (1982); Solinger v. A&M
Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979). However,
the clear focus upon market effects inherent in a rule of reason analysis, see supra at pp. 1312-13, has
ensured the consistency with substantive antitrust principles of target analyses in these cases. This
Note has therefore concentrated upon per se cases, where such consistency has been less certain.
48. The Third Circuit abandoned target terminology and instead looked to the "particular factual
matrix presented" by each case. See Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501,
506 (3d Cir. 1976) (factors in factual matrix include "the nature of the industry in which the alleged
antitrust violation exists, the relationship of the plaintiff to the alleged violator, and the alleged effect
of the antitrust violation upon the plaintiff"). The Sixth Circuit drew upon the Supreme Court's
leading administrative law standing case-Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970)-to formulate a broader standing test. The Circuit held that a § 4 plaintiff must
allege an "injury in fact" (a real economic loss) to an "interest . . . arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated" by the antitrust laws. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d
1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153). The Malamud court appar-
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ance.49 In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,50 it merely remarked: "The lower
courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not
intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries
that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." 1 Since the
Court in Hawaii merely addressed the capacity of a state to sue under
section 4 for injuries to its sovereign interests, it did not adopt any of the
standing approaches used in the various lower court opinions it cited.
Lower courts, however, subsequently cited Hawaii as an indication of the
Supreme Court's approval of, or at least acquiescence in, their respective
approaches. 2
III. THE PROGRESS AWAY FROM TORT DOCTRINE IN STANDING:
BRUNSWICK CORP. V. PUEBLO BOWL-O-MAT, INC.
A. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. and Antitrust Injury
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly address antitrust stand-
ing until 1982, several of its decisions in the late 1970's-especially
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 53-enunciated an approach
to private actions that allowed a more rigorous definition of the injuries
cognizable under section 4. In Brunswick, several bowling centers chal-
lenged the acquisition-arguably in violation of section 7 of the Clayton
Act54 -of several of their competitors by a larger national firm with con-
siderable market power. Though the plaintiffs alleged that the acquiring
firm had used predatory practices, they could prove only that the acquisi-
tions had deprived them of profits they would have made if the acquired
ently thought this zone quite large. It observed: "The antitrust laws were enacted to preserve competi-
tion and thereby to protect the individual plaintiff and the consuming public from the effects of any
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade." 521 F.2d at 1152. For one criticism of this ap-
proach, see Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374 (1976).
49. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), where an independent wholesale and
retail distributor of gasoline claimed to have been injured by his supplier's price discrimination, the
Court upheld plaintiff's recovery of, inter alia, losses he suffered in his capacity as a gas station
lessor. The Court found that the plaintiff was "no mere innocent bystander; he was the principal
victim of the price discrimination practiced by [the defendant]. Since he was directly injured and was
clearly entitled to bring this suit, he was entitled to present evidence of all of his losses to the jury."
Id. at 649-50. Though the Court did not address whether the plaintiff would have had standing if his
only relation to the illegal conduct had been as a lessor, its liberal language implied that such a suit
would have been allowed if the lessor could allege that defendant had intended to harm him. Despite
the absence of any explicit discussion of antitrust standing, Perkins thus seemed to support the tort
law approaches in the area.
50. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
51. Id. at 263 n.14.
52. See, e.g., Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 126-27 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
53. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (prohibiting acquisitions whose effects "may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly").
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centers had closed. 5 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' "lost"
profits, caused by increased rather than decreased competition, were not
"of 'the type that the statute was intended to forestall.' '"56 Emphasizing
that causal linkage to an antitrust violation is not enough, the Court de-
manded that a plaintiff suing under section 4 prove "antitrust injury" and
relate his loss to the procompetitive policies expressed in the antitrust
laws.57
Brunswick thus authoritatively gave greater precision to the principle
that underlay the narrow target area approach: Even if the plaintiff can
show an antitrust violation, courts should allow treble damages only for
injuries reflecting a disruption of competition in the plaintiff's market. 8
Brunswick and J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 59 -another
damage measurement case in which the Court applied its principle of
"antitrust injury"-were expressions of the same concern for "competi-
tion, not competitors"0 that underlay the Court's recent reassertion of the
primacy of the rule of reason. 1
55. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 490 & nn.15-16.
56. Id. at 487-88 (quoting Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967)).
The Brunswick Court's citation of Wyandotte reveals the continuing influence of tort law on the
Court's interpretation of § 4. In Wyandotte, the Court had followed a "general rule of the law of
torts,"-for which it cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS § 286 (1965)-and implied a
right of action from a criminal statute because plaintiff's interest "fell within the class that the statute
was intended to protect" and "the harm that had occurred was of the type that the statute was
intended to forestall." 389 U.S. at 202.
57. 429 U.S. at 489 (emphasis in original). For discussions of "antitrust injury," see Calvani, The
Mushrooming Brunswick Defense: Injury to Competition, Not to Plaintiff, 50 ANTsrrusT L.J. 319,
325-28 (1982); Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury,
47 U. Cni. L. REv. 467, 476-89 (1980).
58. From this perspective, Brunswick was an easy case. The, plaintiffs may well have shown a
violation of § 7-the mere possibility that a large firm active in many markets will cut prices or use
other monopolization tactics in a new market is enough to show a § 7 violation-but they failed to
show that their losses stemmed from the realization of this possibility. The defendant had merely kept
afloat businesses that otherwise would have failed. It had not affected prices in any way. The "lost
profits" the plaintiffs complained of were the result of the very situation that the antitrust laws are
supposed to encourage-free competition among as many firms as a market can support. 429 U.S. at
488. The Brunswick Court's reasoning was heavily influenced by Areeda, Antitrust Violations With-
out Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1127, 1130-36 (1976). See 429 U.S. at 487 n.11.
59. 451 U.S. 557 (1981). In Truett Payne, a car dealer sued his supplier, alleging that the sup-
plier had violated § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13(a) (1982), by forcing him to pay higher prices than had been charged to other dealers. The plain-
tiff sought damages for the difference between the prices he had paid and the lower prices offered to
his competitors. Like § 7 of the Clayton Act, however, § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act is a
prophylactic provision, which may be violated even without any actual effect upon competition. The
Supreme Court therefore followed Brunswick and rejected this "automatic damages" claim. It held
that the plaintiff would have to show that the price discrimination had actually affected competition
among retail dealers and thereby caused his injury-that, as a result of the difference in costs, his
competitors could profitably lower their retail prices and draw customers away from him. 451 U.S. at
562. His damages would therefore be measured not by the difference in prices, but by the profits he
lost.
60. The Brunswick Court borrowed the phrase, 429 U.S. at 488, from Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis in the original).




Soon after Brunswick, the Court spoke to one discrete problem in stand-
ing, though it called the problem one of "injury" rather than of "stand-
ing."" It held in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois13 that indirect purchasers
cannot seek treble damages from antitrust violators for overcharges passed
on by those intermediate in the chain of distribution between the indirect
purchaser and the violators. Though Illinois Brick largely resolved one
standing question to which lower courts had applied the target test,4 the
decision is irrelevant to standing analyses outside the distributional context
in which it arose.8" Illinois Brick established merely that where inherent
difficulties of apportioning losses among injured parties create a danger of
duplicative recoveries, only those parties who have initially paid a particu-
lar overcharge can seek treble damages.88 This rule is quite independent
of the doctrine that the connection between the injury alleged and the
conduct challenge cannot be merely speculative.87 The Illinois Brick Court
in fact conceded that the indirect purchasers seeking recovery might have
been able to tie their losses to the defendants' price fixing. 8
62. The Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), noted that "the question of
which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct
from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them standing to sue for
damages under § 4." Id. at 728 n.7. The difference, however, between holding a plaintiff to have no
standing and holding that an injury he could well have suffered is not legally cognizable is quite
elusive. See infra note 68. More recently, the Court has recognized that Illinois Brick is essentially a
standing analysis. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council, 103 S. Ct. 897, 912
(1983).
63. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
64. See, e.g., Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976) (employing
target test and holding indirect purchasers have standing), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720 (1977); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973) (same),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
65. The rule, of course, should not be applied in all chain-of-distribution contexts. Courts should,
for example, permit both a wholesaler and a manufacturer to seek recovery for profits lost as a result
of a competing manufacturer's alleged price discrimination or predatory pricing. Their damages, in
such a case, consist of their lost profits, not the higher price paid by the wholesaler; the concerns of a
rule addressing the passing-on of an injury are therefore not implicated. See Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1246, 1254-56 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238, 315 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 967 n.20 (3d Cir. 1983) (approving Zenith court's reasoning), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 1278 (1984).
66. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745-47.
67. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931) (dam-
ages which are not "the certain result of the wrong" cannot be recovered); Weinberg, Recent Trends
in Antitrust Civil Action Damage Determinations, 1976 DUKE L.J. 485, 489-90.
Several decisions have inappropriately relied upon Illinois Brick for the proposition that complex
theories of causation cannot support § 4 claims. See, e.g., In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691
F.2d 1335, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1982); Reading Indus. Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 631 F.2d 10, 14
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981); see also Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d
885, 895-98 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying Illinois Brick to bar suit by plaintiff seeking damages for losses
suffered when forced to sell, at depressed price, stock in corporation that defendants allegedly boy-
cotted). Since stock values are not solely a function of corporate revenue, the loss of the plaintiff in
Stein had not truly been "passed-on" to him.
68. The Court admitted that its holding denied "recovery to those indirect purchasers who may
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B. Brunswick and Standing Doctrine
Some courts and commentators treated Brunswick as irrelevant to
standing doctrine. Because the standing of the Brunswick plaintiffs had
never been challenged, these readers concluded that only a trial on the
merits could determine whether a plaintiff has suffered an "antitrust in-
jury."69 They failed to realize that the Brunswick plaintiffs' allegations of
predatory pricing had made a grant of standing quite proper. If the plain-
tiffs had, at the outset, attributed their losses solely to the continued exis-
tence of their competitors instead of alleging a disruption of the market,
their lack of "antitrust injury" and of standing would have been clear
from the start. Whether a plaintiff's claim is defeated at the standing stage
or the damages stage may thus be merely a matter of when his theory of
causation becomes clear.7
Some lower courts used Brunswick solely to reinforce their own diverse
approaches to standing.71 Indeed, the Second and Seventh Circuits were
quite correct in using Brunswick to confirm their tests' results. As the
Second circuit's decision in Fields Productions illustrates, 7  the only dif-
ference between the Second Circuit's test and Brunswick's approach lay in
their analytical progressions. The circuit's analysis looked to the particu-
lar per se rule invoked and then determined whether that rule presumed
have been actually injured by antitrust violations." 431 U.S. at 746; see Dart Drug Corp. v. Coming
Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1102 n.13 (D. Md. 1979) ("[T]he Supreme Court acknowledged in
Illinois Brick that indirect purchasers might actually be injured by an overcharge, but for policy
reasons the Court foreclosed such purchasers from attempting to prove injury. Such a prophylactic
rule differs from the usual case-by-case analysis required in a determination of standing.").
69. In Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1982), the
Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not
prove antitrust injury; the court held that any inquiry into antitrust injury must await trial on the
merits. The decision was later vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in the wake of Associated
Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983) (see infra pp.
1326-28). 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). Upon reconsideration, the Fifth Circuit reached the same result,
using a more appropriate analysis. 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983). A similar misconception of the
meaning of antitrust injury led one commentator to note: "[Ilt invites confusion . . . indiscriminately
to merge the doctrines of standing, antitrust injury and pass-on into a single, unitary principle. .. "
Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Termn-1977,
77 COLJM. L. REv. 979, 996-97 (1977).
70. As one perceptive court observed with regard to "antitrust injury" and antitrust standing:
"We suspect that the different terminologies may be a function of the differences in procedural pos-
ture of particular cases, with objections based upon 'standing' arising at earlier stages of the litigation
than those based upon lack of injury or causation. The concepts, however, are virtually identical."
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1158 n.70 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(Becker, J.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983); see GAF
Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 759 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
71. See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 545 F. Supp. 765, 774 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(applying target test and Brunswick in seriatim, without recognizing relationship between the two),
aff'd, 712 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983); Pollock v. Citrus Assocs., 512 F.
Supp. 711, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); Star Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping
Auth., 451 F. Supp. 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same).
72. See supra note 47.
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any disruption of the plaintiff's market. The analysis implicit in Bruns-
wick focuses first on the plaintiff's market and then on whether the plain-
tiff, through either a per se claim or rule of reason allegations, can indi-
cate some effect upon that market.
7
1
After Brunswick, therefore, the Ninth Circuit's refusal to abandon the
doctrine that permitted standing to the kind of plaintiff barred by Fields
Productions was unjustified. By continuing to consider intent and foresee-
ability in its analysis of standing in per se claims, the Ninth Circuit ex-
panded the scope of section 4 beyond that allowed by Brunswick." In
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.,7 5 for example, a former sales manager al-
leged that his employer had forced his resignation to prevent him from
interfering in a conspiracy to fix prices. Even though the plaintiff clearly
had failed to indicate any disruption of competition in his own mar-
ket-the labor market-the Ninth Circuit found him to have standing
under section 4. It reasoned that the "[d]ischarge of those who refuse to
participate [in a price fixing conspiracy] is essential to success of the
scheme"' and concluded that the plaintiff had suffered a direct injury.
77
Ironically-in light of its previous idiosyncratic approach"--the circuit
most receptive to Brunswick was the Sixth. Following the Supreme
73. After Brunswick, in a case similar to Fields Productions, the Seventh Circuit recognized the
essential identity between the "narrow" target approach and Brunswick's analysis. In Repp v. F.E.L.
Publications, 688 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1982), a composer of liturgical music challenged his publisher's
practice of charging an annual blanket fee to those wishing to copy his and other composers' works.
The court denied him standing. It observed that Brunswick's "antitrust injury" test could be under-
stood through either the "direct injury" or "target area" approach, id. at 444, but that, regardless of
which approach was used, Repp's injury did not implicate the concerns of the antitrust laws, id. at
447. As in block booking, the publisher's blanket licensing could conceivably have forced purchasers to
buy unwanted titles and have limited the ability of other composers and/or the licensors of their
works to compete in the market for musical works. These parties would thus have standing if they
claimed injury. But, as the court observed, Repp's "access to the marketplace with musical works he
owns" was "unaffected"; he therefore fell "outside the range of economic injuries intended to be pro-
tected by a declaration that the licensing practice is unlawful." Id. at 446 (emphasis in original).
74. Soon after Brunswick, a district court in the Ninth Circuit examined that decision's effect
upon the authority of Mulvey, see supra p. 1317. Vaguely defining "antitrust injury" as any injury
directly attributable to an antitrust violation, the court held that Mulvey remained controlling. Laugh-
lin v. Wells, 446 F. Supp. 48, 52 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
75. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
76. Id. at 1384.
77. Id. at 1385 (observing that plaintiff's injury flowed "immediately, not remotely or indirectly"
from his employer's violation). In a similar case, the Seventh Circuit later rejected the analysis in
Ostrofe as inconsistent with Brunswick's principle that a plaintiff must indicate some anticompetitive
effect in the market in which he is a participant. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig. (Bichan v.
Chemetron), 681 F.2d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1982) (employee allegedly terminated for refusing to adhere
to employer's collusive marketing practices denied standing by court, observing: "Since the area of the
economy endangered by the anticompetitive scheme was not the labor market, [plaintiff] can claim no
'antitrust injury."'), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983); see also Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp.,
537 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (applying target test to deny standing to plaintiff similar to
that in Bichan). But cf. Note, Employee Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 81 MIcH. L.
REv. 1846, 1859-66 (1983) (arguing that discharged employees like Ostrofe should be allowed stand-
ing because of their contribution to efficient antitrust enforcement).
78. See supra note 48.
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Court's decision, the circuit made "antitrust injury" a standing require-
ment in addition to its "zone of interests" test." Because the "zone" test
had been so vague and unrestricted, this change made Brunswick the cen-
terpiece of the circuit's standing doctrine.80
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S STANDING CASES IN THE 1980's
By the 1980's, then, most lower courts-with the exception of the
Ninth Circuit-were moving towards standing approaches consistent with
Brunswick's focus upon effects within the plaintiff's own market. In 1982,
however, the Supreme Court derailed this movement away from tort anal-
yses in Blue Shield v. McCready,"' the first decision in which the Court
explicitly addressed the standing question.
A. Blue Shield v. McCready
The employer of the plaintiff in McCready had provided her with
health-plan coverage from Blue Shield. As a condition of reimbursement,
the plan required physician supervision over all visits to psychologists. In
contrast, the plan automatically reimbursed subscribers for visits to psy-
chiatrists. The plaintiff-subscriber had sought and received treatment
from a psychologist without obtaining a physician's approval. When the
plan refused to reimburse her for the costs of her treatment, she sought
treble damages for the denied reimbursements from Blue Shield and from
the group of psychiatrists that had allegedly aided in the design of the
provision.
McCready thus presented the standard challenge to antitrust standing
doctrine: An arguably per se illegal practice had affected a variety of vic-
tims, and the Court had to determine which of these victims had suffered
injuries cognizable under section 4. The challenged practice clearly resem-
bled a boycott (albeit a conditional one) of the psychologists, initiated by
competing psychiatrists.8 2 If psychologists had lost potential patients, their
79. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1235 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
893 (1981).
80. See J.F. Reed Co. v. K Mart Corp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,499-500 (E.D. Mich.
1981).
81. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
82. The Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists had, at the same time as the McCready plain-
tiff, filed suit against Blue Shield of Virginia, Blue Shield of Southwestern Virginia, and the Neuro-
psychiatric Society of Virginia, alleging a conspiracy to favor psychiatrists to the detriment of psychol-
ogists. In that case, the Fourth Circuit observed that "[b]ecause of the special considerations involved
in the delivery of health services, we are not prepared to apply a per se rule of illegality to medical
plans which refuse or condition payments to competing or potentially competing providers." Virginia
Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 484 (4th Cir. 1980). The court
nevertheless held that the defendants' alleged conspiracy was, in form, a conditional concerted refusal
to deal.
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losses for standing purposes would clearly be "antitrust injuries," within
the meaning of Brunswick. The per se rule against boycotts presumes that
competition in their market would have been endangered by defendants'
practice. The question in McCready was thus whether the plaintiff-
subscriber could also claim an "antitrust injury." By considering this
question, the McCready Court authoritatively recognized Brunswick's ap-
plicability to standing analyses.8 3 Moreover, as Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court, noted, the injury claimed by the plaintiff was distinct from
the injuries that psychologists might have suffered. 4
The limited reading that the McCready Court gave Brunswick, how-
ever, permitted it to shift its focus from the market analysis implied by
Brunswick to the circumstantial connection of the plaintiff's injury to the
defendants' illegal practice.8 5 The Court reasoned that only by denying
reimbursements to those subscribers who made unapproved visits to psy-
chologists could the defendants place the psychologists at a competitive
disadvantage. The harm to the plaintiff was thus "a necessary step in
effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy."88 Indeed, her injury
was "inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to
inflict on psychologists and the psychotherapy market. 8s7 These formula-
tions harken back to those cases where a court's view of the directness of a
plaintiff's injury controlled and ignore the fact that the question of
whether an injury is "intertwined" with an antitrust conspiracy's ends is
irrelevant to the market analysis demanded by Brunswick."8
83. McCready, 457 U.S. at 483 n.19.
84. Id. at 475. The McCready plaintiff's claim was therefore not barred by the rule of Illinois
Brick, see supra p. 1321.
85. In a footnote, the Brunswick Court had observed that a § 4 plaintiff need not "prove an actual
lessening of competition in order to recover. . . . [Clompetitors may be able to prove antitrust injury
before they actually are driven from the market and competition is thereby lessened." 429 U.S. at 489
n.14. This observation addressed predatory practices which, though they might initially benefit con-
sumers by lowering prices, are condemned because of their ultimate effects. The theory of predatory
pricing is that once prices are so low that most competitors are forced to drop out of the market, the
price-cutting firm can recoup its losses by profiting from the newly diminished competitiveness of its
market. The initial losses to the competitors are therefore antitrust injuries because they are of signifi-
cance to the entire market; the competitors are thus allowed § 4 standing. But see Easterbrook, Preda-
tory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 331-33 (1981) (arguing that competi-
tors should not be permitted to sue for predatory pricing). The McCready Court, however, apparently
interpreted the Brunswick footnote to mean that a plaintiff may have § 4 standing even though compe-
tition in her market was neither lessened nor even endangered, as long as competition somewhere has
been affected. McCready, 457 U.S. at 482-83; see id. at 483 n.19 ("Most obviously, McCready's claim
is quite unlike the claim asserted by the plaintiff in Brunswick for she does not seek to label increased
competition as a harm to her.").
86. 457 U.S. at 479.
87. Id. at 484.
88. At various points in its opinion, the McCready Court adumbrated a standing analysis more
consistent with Brunswick. By characterizing defendants' practice as a "concerted refusal to reim-
burse," id. at 480, Justice Brennan eliminated the need for any inquiry into market effects, since the
per se rule against concerted refusals clearly allows standing to boycotted parties. See also id. at 484
n.21 (plaintiff's plight likened to that of hypothetical bank boycotted by psychiatrists until it ceased to
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The McCready Court's focus upon the proximity of the plaintiff's in-
jury to the per se illegality impeded the progress of post-Brunswick stand-
ing doctrine toward systematization. Most notably, the decision allowed
the Ninth Circuit to continue its peculiar definition of target areas. In
Aurora Enterprises v. NBC,89 faced with a factual situation very similar
to that in Mulvey,9" the Ninth Circuit relied upon McCready to support
its refusal to overturn Mulvey as inconsistent with Brunswick." Those
courts that had previously adhered to the narrow target approach held the
line, however, citing McCready only for general propositions of standing
and refusing to expand the scope of section 4.92
B. Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters
While the Supreme Court had waited 92 years before explicitly ad-
dressing the standing question, it waited only a year before acting to mini-
mize the confusion caused by McCready.3 In Associated General Contrac-
tors v. California State Council of Carpenters,9 a number of carpenters
make loans to psychologists). The Court's focus upon "inextricable linkage," however, overshadowed
this market-oriented strain of McCready.
In their dissenting opinions, justices Rehnquist and Stevens also followed Brunswick's analysis, but
they quarreled with the Court's characterization of the defendants' behavior with respect to the plain-
tiffs. They noted that the "boycott" the Court discerned seemed more akin to a seller's refusal to
provide a commodity on the precise terms sought by a consumer than to a concerted refusal to deal;
the plaintiff had simply sought reimbursements for the cost of services not covered by her plan. Id. at
490-91 & n.7 (Rehnquist J., dissenting); id. at 494 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. 688 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1982).
90. The plaintiff-producers alleged that the defendant-television network had block booked certain
programs they had produced, thereby depriving plaintiffs of some of the royalties they otherwise
would have received. Id. at 691-93.
91. The district court had found the plaintiffs lacked standing; it reasoned that Mulvey, on which
plaintiffs relied, should be considered overruled by Brunswick. Aurora Enters. v. NBC, 524 F. Supp.
655, 659 (C.D. Cal. 1981). The Ninth Circuit reversed. It asserted that McCready-decided after the
trial court's decision-supported Mulvey, which thus remained "the law of this circuit." 688 F.2d at
693.
The Aurora court's emphasis upon the continued vitality of Mulvey led it to give little reasoning in
support of its decision. But it did distinguish Brunswick in a remarkable way: "Competition was
increased by defendants' actions in Brunswick; therefore, plaintiffs suffered no antitrust injury. In
contrast, the alleged tying arrangement in the present case is a per se violation of the antitrust laws."
Id. (emphasis in original). This construction of § 4 would give all individuals injured by a per se
violation standing to sue for treble damages.
92. See, e.g., Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 821 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
McCready in support of Second Circuit's target approach), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984); Dos
Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1350 n.4 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing
McCready to support observation that "antitrust injury" is needed for § 4 standing); Car Carriers v.
Ford Motor Co., 561 F. Supp. 885, 887 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (same).
93. The Court might have been prodded by the justice Department. In a case that appeared to be
more concerned with the antitrust labor exemption than antitrust standing, the Solicitor General filed
an amicus brief endorsing the lower court's holding as to the exemption but challenging that court's
standing analysis. Brief for the United States, Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council
of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
94. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
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unions sued a membership corporation of building and construction con-
tractors and its members, claiming that the defendants had pursued a con-
certed campaign against the plaintiffs. The defendants had allegedly in-
duced members and non-members both to avoid entering into collective
bargaining agreements with the plaintiffs and to disfavor those who had
signed such agreements. Applying Brunswick, the Supreme Court over-
turned the Ninth Circuit's application of the target test9 5 and held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing under section 4.
The allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint made the application of
Brunswick simple and decisive. Not only did the complaint fail to identity
the exact nature of the plaintiffs' injuries,"8 but it also alleged restraints
only in the markets for construction contractors and subcontractors 97 with-
out indicating that the plaintiffs' own market-the market for labor un-
ions-had been affected.9" That the plaintiff unions were not participants
in the carpentry-contracting market was so clear that the Court could eas-
ily distinguish McCready.99
Thus, although the unions were the intended targets of the defendants'
alleged conspiracy, the Court found their section 4 standing barred by
Brunswick.'00 Even while preventing the tort principle of intent from in-
fluencing its standing analysis, however, the Court conflated standing and
causation by emphasizing the "indirectness" of plaintiffs' injury as an al-
ternative ground for denying their standing."' The Court's reliance upon
this common-law principle might, in part, be attributed to the many
95. The Ninth Circuit, applying its liberal target area analysis, granted the plaintiffs standing
since the alleged injuries were not merely a "foreseeable consequence" of defendants' conduct but its
"intended result." California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d
527, 538 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
96. 103 S. Ct. at 911.
97. The Court recognized that any coercion directed at contractors and subcontractors might vio-
late the antitrust laws. Its opinion, however, indicated its reluctance to invoke the per se rule against
boycotts. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, observed that the "allegedly unlawful conduct involves
predatory behavior directed at 'certain' parties, rather than a claim that output has been curtailed or
prices enhanced throughout an entire competitive market." Id. at 909 n.40. Such a concern with
actual market effects is appropriate only to a rule of reason analysis and might presage a re-
evaluation of the per se rule against boycotts.
98. Justice Stevens noted: "The amended complaint. . . does not allege any restraint on competi-
tion in the market for labor union services . . . . [Iun this case there is no claim that competition
between rival unions has been injured or even that any rival unions exist." Id. at 903 n.14.
99. "In this case,. . . the Union was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in which
trade was restrained." Id. at 909.
100. Id. at 909-10.
101. Id. at 910. The Court seems to have used "directness" in two related but distinct senses. Like
lower courts using "directness" as a standing test, see supra pp. 1314-15, it noted the long and
complex chain of causation that separated plaintiffs from the challenged conduct. 103 S. Ct. at
910-11. The Court also alluded, however, to the "vaguely defined links" in that chain. Id. at 910. It
thus seems to have conflated the direct injury standing analysis with the separate rule of Bigelow and
Story against speculative theories of injury. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251,
263-66 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931);
supra note 67.
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lower-court cases that-lacking a more systematic approach-had drawn
upon "proximate cause" to restrict the sweeping language of section 4.1°2
Another reason for the Court's discussion of proximate cause may have
been the Court's desire to legitimize its use of Brunswick's analysis by
rooting it in legislative history. Just as "proximate cause" limited tort re-
coveries, so, the Court argued, certain similar restrictions were implicit in
section 4.'13 Therefore, "consequential" harms1104-such as those suffered
by the plaintiffs in Associated General Contractors-were not cognizable
in either tort or antitrust law.
There are two problems, however, with this particular resort to legisla-
tive history. First, as the Court itself recently observed in Texas Industries
v. Radcliff Materials,10 5 "[tihe intent to allow courts to develop governing
principles of law, so unmistakably clear with regard to substantive viola-
tions, does not appear in debates on the treble-damages action created in
section 7 of the original [Sherman] Act . . . ."'0 The legislative histories
of section 7 of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act are
bereft of any indications that concepts such as directness were to have any
relevance to determinations of standing.10 7 Second, as Justice Marshall
pointed out in his Associated General Contractors dissent: "An inquiry
into proximate cause has traditionally been deemed unnecessary in suits
against intentional tortfeasors."' 08
It is still too early to assess the impact of Associated General Contrac-
tors upon standing doctrine. If the decision will have any effects other
than to confirm the primacy of Brunswick's analysis, it will be because the
decision's proximate cause discussion can justify grants of standing based
upon a plaintiff's circumstantial relationship to a violation.10 9 Such depar-
tures, however, have yet to occur.1 0 Since Associated General Contrac-
tors, lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's direction to analyze
standing questions "in light of""' the factors delineated in that case."1
102. See supra pp. 1314-15.
103. 103 S. Ct. at 906-07.
104. Id. at 906 n.25.
105. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
106. Id. at 643-44.
107. See supra note 28.
108. 103 S. Ct. at 914 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. See Note, supra note 77 (using proximity analyses of McCready and Associated General
Contractors to support a policy argument favoring § 4 suits by employees like Ostrofe, see supra p.
1323, discharged for refusing to participate in their employers' antitrust conspiracy).
110. Since the court most likely to produce such a departure, the Ninth Circuit, had one applica-
tion of its doctrine overturned in Associated General Contractors, departures from the Supreme
Court's standard seem less likely now than they did after McCready.
111. After noting the diverse standing approaches prevailing in the lower courts, the Associated
General Contractors Court counseled: "In our view, courts should analyze each situation in light of
the factors set forth in the text infra." 103 S. Ct. at 908 n.33.
112. In Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth
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While consideration of "proximity and directness" has on occasion led to
the complication of rather simple standing questions,"' courts so far have
followed Brunswick and focused upon competition in the plaintiff's
market. 1114
CONCLUSION
A standing doctrine based upon Brunswick and focusing upon the
plaintiff's market cannot easily be culled from the legislative history of the
treble-damages provision. But neither can approaches based upon intent,
foreseeability, or proximity. The advantages of a Brunswick approach are
that it comports with prevailing views of the goals of antitrust law, partic-
ularly the distinction between per se offenses and offenses prohibited by
the rule of reason, and that it produces uniform results if properly ap-
plied. If fully adopted by the lower courts, the Brunswick analysis will
take the confusion out of standing doctrine and put it back in substantive
antitrust law-where it belongs.
-Daniel C. Richman
Circuit listed the factors it distilled from Associated General Contractors:.
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and harm to the plaintiff and whether
that harm was intended to be caused; (2) the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury including
the status of the plaintiff as consumer or competitor in the relevant market; (3) the directness
or indirectness of the injury, and the related inquiry of whether the damages are speculative;
(4) the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages; and (5) the
existence of more direct victims of the alleged antitrust violation.
Id. at 1085.
When the Third Circuit sought to list the "factors" identified in Associated General Contractors, it
came up with a somewhat different list: "the causal connection between an antitrust violation and the
injured party, the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury, and the directness or indirectness of the
asserted injury." Mexican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 964-65 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1278 (1984).
113. In Southaven Land Co., a lessor of commercial premises alleged that a lessee of one of its
properties had prevented the establishment of a grocery store on that property as part of its conspiracy
to monopolize the area's retail grocery market. Brunswick would clearly bar a monopolization claim
by a plaintiff who is not a participant in the relevant market claimed to be threatened. The Southaven
court, however, did not cease its inquiry upon recognizing that the plaintiff was "neither a consumer,
competitor or participant" in the relevant product market, but went on to the question of whether
plaintiff's injury was "inextricably intertwined" with injuries in that market. 715 F.2d at 1086.
Though the Sixth Circuit ultimately came to the conclusion it would have if it had adhered to Bruns-
wick, it felt bound by McCready and Associated General Contractors to consider "proximity and di-
rectness." Id. at 1085.
114. See Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1983). In
Crimpers, a firm organized to hold a trade show to facilitate contacts between producers of cable
television programming and local cable television stations charged that defendants, two companies
allegedly dominating the business of purchasing and assembling programming for sale to stations, had
conspired to cause the boycott of its trade show. The Second Circuit found the plaintiff to have stand-
ing because his injury was "inextricably intertwined with the injury the defendants sought to inflict
on producers and television stations in the cable television programming market." Id. at 294-95.
Throughout its opinion, however, the court was careful to emphasize that the plaintiff was "'a com-
petitor in the market in which trade was restrained,"' id. at 296 n.9 (quoting Associated General
Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 909), that is, the market for programming middlemen.
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